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ExclusionDisaster recovery efforts form an essential component of coping with unforeseen events such as earth-
quakes, hurricanes, floods, and typhoons, some of which will only become more frequent or severe in
the face of accelerated climate change. Most of the time, disaster recovery efforts produce net benefits
to society. However, depending on their design and governance, some projects can germinate adverse
social, political, and economic outcomes. Drawing from concepts in political economy, political ecology,
justice theory, and critical development studies, this study first presents a conceptual typology revolving
around four key processes: enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment. Enclosure refers to
when disaster recovery transfers public assets into private hands or expands the roles of private actors
into the public sphere. Exclusion refers to when disaster recovery limits access to resources or marginal-
izes particular stakeholders in decision-making activities. Encroachment refers to when efforts intrude on
biodiversity areas or contribute to other forms of environmental degradation. Entrenchment refers to
when disaster recovery aggravates the disempowerment of women and minorities, or worsens concen-
trations of wealth and income inequality within a community. The study then documents the presence
of these four inequitable attributes across four empirical case studies: Hurricane Katrina reconstruction
in the United States, recovery efforts for the 2004 tsunami in Thailand, Typhoon Yolanda in the
Philippines, and the Canterbury earthquakes in New Zealand. It next offers three policy recommendations
for analysts, program managers, and researchers at large: spreading risks via insurance, adhering to prin-
ciples of free prior informed consent, and preventing damage through punitive environmental bonds. The
political economy of disaster must be taken into account so that projects can maximize their efficacy and
avoid marginalizing those most vulnerable to those very disasters.
 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Sometimes, the human response to a natural disaster can exac-
erbate its impact, even more than the event itself. Kates, Colten,
Laska, and Leatherman (2006: 14659)write ‘‘because disasters tend
to accelerate existing economic, social, and political trends, the tra-
jectory for full recovery (preexisting population, economy, and
infrastructure) is not promising.” Laska and Morrow (2006: 16)
argue that the ‘‘goal of disaster resilient communities cannot be
reached until basic issues of inequality and social justice are
addressed.” Bullard and Wright (2009; xxv) add ‘‘Quite often, thescale of a disaster’s impact . . . has more to do with the political
economy of the country, region, and state than with the hurricane’s
category strength.” Their statements underline a stream of research
showing hownatural disasters are worsened by human factors such
as mismanagement, underdevelopment, profiteering, neoliberal
capitalism, and crisis politics (Hinchcliffe and Woodward, 2004;
Klein, 2008; Weber and Messias, 2012; Cretney, 2017; Sovacool,
2017, 2018). Viewed in this manner, disasters are more ‘‘catastro-
phes in the making” (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska, & Erikson,
2009), ‘‘unnatural disasters” (Laska and Morrow 2006), and ‘‘disas-
ters by design” (Mileti, 1999) instead of random events, by no
means the result of biophysical or natural phenomenon alone.
So far, however, research on these types of political economy
pressures and disaster recovery (DR) remains scant. Neumayer
et al. (2014) offer a compelling assessment of how governments





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































244 B.K. Sovacool et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 243–255politics of natural disasters from the perspective of international
trade. Cutter et al. (2014) explore the dynamics (and geographies)
of community resilience to disaster. D’Alisa and Kallis (2016) offer
an intriguing connection between Gramscian theories of the state
and the political ecology of some types of DR, framed around the
notion of climate change adaptation; Cretney (2017) examines
the discursive elements of DR and ‘‘geographies of crisis.”
In contrast to these works, we aim to offer a conceptual typol-
ogy that makes mapping political economy pressures more trans-
parent and systematic, in the hope that the vulnerabilities they
give rise to can be better managed and minimized. In this study,
to conceptualize how DR efforts may encounter issues of injustice,
vulnerability, and inequality, we synthesize from four distinct
schools of thought: political economy, political ecology, social jus-
tice, and critical development studies. Political economy broadly
deals with how (capitalist) markets interact with the interests of
state actors (government). Political ecology deals broadly with
the winners and losers of environmental change (and responses
to it). Social justice concerns itself with the distribution of costs
and benefits as well as decision-making processes (and forums
for due process and representation therein). Critical development
studies has emerged to critique an overly reductionist, top-down
approach to development assistance and policy that seeks
to remake the developing world in the image of western
(or Northern) industrialized countries.
Drawing from these admittedly diverse literatures, we propose
that DR efforts can, at times, propagate four interconnected politi-
cal economy processes that operate systemically. Enclosure refers
to when public assets become privatized or private actors extend
their reach and autonomy into the public sphere. Exclusion refers
to when DR actors marginalize particular groups in decision-
making fora. Encroachment refers to when DR projects damage
the environment, notably biodiversity conservation zones or frag-
ile ecosystems. Entrenchment refers to when DR projects worsen
social or economic inequality. Through four case studies we show
how DR projects can exacerbate poverty, racism, sexism, and clas-
sism (the United States), entrench and aggravate poverty (Thailand
and Philippines), and marginalize local communities while slowing































































































































































































































































































































































ar2. Presenting a conceptual typology of political economy and
ecology
In this section, we (briefly) synthesize from four separate disci-
plines—political economy, political ecology, justice theory, and
critical development studies—to lay the groundwork for our polit-
ical economy typology based on enclosure, exclusion, encroach-
ment, and entrenchment. Table 1 offers a high-level summary of
these four disciplines.
In its broadest sense, the term political economy deals with
how government, or the ‘‘state,” interacts with the private sector,
or ‘‘the market” (Gilpin 1987). As Van de Graaf et al. (2016: 4)
put it succinctly, political economy examines ‘‘the relationship
between politics and economics, between states and markets.” Part
of this involves the area of inquiry here, notably material provi-
sioning, or how the political-economic system distributes material
(and even immaterial) costs and benefits (Caporaso and Levine,
1992). Political economy therefore involves the study of struggle,
or the processes by which some actors benefit from particular sys-
tems or processes at the exclusion of others (Wolff and Resnik,
1987).
The closely related field of political ecology, in its broadest
sense, also focuses on the influence of power relations and struc-
tural inequalities, but with a closer link to human processes which
degrade the natural environment (Wolf, 1972). Bryant and Bailey
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erally emphasize how the benefits and burdens of environmental
change, or access to resources, are distributed across actors inequi-
tably, which can serve to reinforce elitism or reduce social and eco-
nomic equality. As such, Robbins (2004: 20) adds that political
ecology research ‘‘tends to reveal winners and losers, hidden costs,
and the differential power that produces social and environmental
outcomes.”
Another relevant, related domain of inquiry is often termed
with various prefixes to justice: social, environmental, climate, or
energy ‘‘justice.” Social justice refers to equal or equitable distribu-
tion of wealth and opportunities in a given society. Environmental
justice is concerned with the distribution of environmental haz-
ards and access to natural resources; it includes equal protection
from burdens, meaningful involvement in decisions, and fair treat-
ment in access to the benefits (Low and Gleeson, 1998; Schlosberg,
1999; Byrne et al., 2002; Bowen and Wells, 2002; Walker, 2012).
Climate and energy justice are closely linked, and refer to the fair-
ness, virtue, or equity dimensions of actions and decisions concern-
ing greenhouse gases and energy production and use (Arnold,
2011; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2014; Sovacool, Sidortsov, & Jones,
2014; Sovacool et al., 2016).
A final supporting school of thought comes from critical devel-
opment studies or theory. Though vast, this type of scholarship
generally critiques the global process of economic development.
These theorists argue that ‘‘development” has only enabled
advanced capitalist states, and recently major emerging econo-
mies, to define, know, and ‘‘meet” the needs of the ‘‘underdevel-
oped,” essentially establishing a hierarchy of societies and
cultures (Escobar, 1995). Under this view, development agencies
have maintained a largely technocratic approach to intervention
and assistance, relying on centrally conceived projects run by
development experts accountable to narrowly defined, quantita-
tive indicators (Scott, 1998). A core conclusion in critical develop-
ment studies is that such approaches need to be countered by
participatory (Nelson and Wright, 1995; Schneider et al., 1995)
or reflexive modes of development practice (Pieterse, 2001), which
place a greater emphasis on local knowledge, and uncover the
political nature of development activities (Ferguson, 1994).
The considerable similarity between these four domains of
inquiry convinced us that their tenets can be partially synthesized.
So far, the framework has been applied to climate change adapta-
tion (Sovacool et al., 2015; Sovacool and Linnér, 2015; Sovacool
et al., 2017; Sovacool, 2018) but not other sectors such as climate
change mitigation or DR. Here, we argue when applied to DR
efforts, the framework emphasizes three concerns:
 Costs, or how the hazards and externalities of DR can be
imposed on communities unequally, often the poor, disempow-
ered, or marginalized;Table 2
Summary of the processes and sub-processes of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and








Dispossession, accumulation by d
Ecological Encroachment Damaging the
environment
Commodification, subordination,
Social Entrenchment Worsening social
inequality
Comparative advantage, elite cap
Source: Authors. Benefits, or how access to a particular form of DR might be
biased or unevenly distributed;
 Procedures, or how DR efforts might proceed with exclusionary
forms of decision-making rules and procedures that lack due
process for involvement and representation of vulnerable
stakeholders.
With an appreciation for looking at how the costs, benefits, and
procedures of DR might play out on the international stage, we
propose the following four processes summarized by Table 2.
Enclosure refers to when a DR project transfers a public or social
asset into private hands, or expands the role and authority of a pri-
vate actor into a formerly public sphere. It relates in part to how
private institutions, especially corporate actors, intensify their
efforts to penetrate into more remote or peripheral areas from
which they can derive revenue (McCarthy, 2009). It can involve
the incorporation of DR into what Hoogvelt (1987: 3) calls the
act of ‘‘territorial accumulation” and the ‘‘continuous self-
expansion of capital within the global system.” In this way, DR
can expand the reach of capital as it ‘‘stretches” the reach of the
market to encompass remote areas, and ‘‘deepens” capitalism by
allowing it to penetrate into the provision of yet more goods and
services (Prudham et al., 2009). In short, DR projects become ‘‘en-
closed” as part of the strategy of capitalist accumulation (Harvey,
2003). Enclosure can occur with physical resources such as money
or land, or it can relate to immaterial resources such as power and
sovereignty.
Exclusion often occurs in tandem with enclosure (Heynen and
Robbins, 2007), and it refers to when a DR project excludes or dis-
places a particular group of stakeholders or limits access to
resources related to due process, fairness, and procedural justice.
The process of exclusion enables resources to be appropriated or
consolidated by state authorities, private firms, or social elites
(Robbins, 2004). In many cases, relevant community based organi-
zations or individuals are excluded from the decision-making pro-
cess via the process of containment, a way to prevent and manage
other actors from interfering with one’s interests (Few, Brown, &
Tompkins, 2007). ‘‘Exclusion” is close to the notions of ‘‘disposses-
sion” and ‘‘accumulation by dispossession” affiliated with capital-
ism, or that of ‘‘tyranny” affiliated with unfair decision-making
processes (Harvey, 2003; Harvey, 2006). Cooke and Kothari
(2001) frame their investigation of exclusion with the language
of ‘‘tyranny,” arguing that decision-making processes themselves
can become tyrannical and exclusionary. One way this exclusion
can occur is when multilateral or international agencies and fun-
ders dominate discussions and decision-making about DR.
Encroachment refers to when DR projects degrade the environ-
ment, interfere with ecosystem services provision, or intrude upon
biodiversity conservation zones such as protected areas and




Political geography, environmental geography, public
policy, public administration, neo-Marxism
ispossession, tyranny Political ecology, climate policy, development studies
forum shopping Ecology, environmental science, biodiversity
conservation, consumption studies
ture Welfare economics, environmental justice, gender
studies, political economy
246 B.K. Sovacool et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 243–255conservation itself can encroach upon indigenous lands or promote
capitalist agendas is well documented (Bryant, 1998; Brockington
and Igoe, 2006; Igoe, Neves, & Brockington, 2010; Peluso and
Lund, 2011); less attention has focused on how hegemonic DR
projects can encroach upon ecosystems or create their own type
of environmental degradation. DR can, because it is primarily
concerned with building human resilience, undermine the conser-
vation of biodiversity (Turner et al., 2010). Reconstruction efforts
can involve sand and gravel extraction from river channels and
the rapid siting of new housing without regard to environmental
sensitivity. In other situations, DR efforts can take advantage of
property destruction to redistrict or redesign urban areas in elites’
favor (Sovacool, 2017). DR efforts can also sometimes lead to
increased greenhouse gas emissions—encroaching upon (reducing
the efficacy of) efforts to mitigate carbon dioxide. For instance,
relocating critical infrastructure outside of floodplains can enhance
resilience but requires increased emissions due to the rebuilding of
structures; it also likely increases sprawl and associated emissions
from transport.
Entrenchment refers to when a DR project aggravates the disem-
powerment of women or minorities. It ‘‘entrenches” inequality by
interfering with egalitarian systems of distribution or procedural
justice, or by further concentrating wealth within a community
or transferring risk. Economic entrenchment can occur when it is
typically wealthier households that possess the requisite assets
to maintain resilience in the face of a disaster—or in extreme situ-
ations—take advantage of vulnerable groups. It is these more pow-
erful actors that can utilize cash or other productive assets to
rebuild, rent buildings, purchase equipment, diversify livelihood
opportunities or retrieve information that they can utilize to
broaden and extend their influence. Poorer actors, by contrast, can-
not generally afford to undertake these activities (Little et al., 2001;
Holling, Gunderson, & Ludwig, 2002). Entrenchment, in other
words, masks and maintains, and at times worsens, existing power
relationships within or between households and communities
(Christens and Speer, 1996).3. Research method: Comparative qualitative case studies
To collect data for our study and conduct our analysis, we fol-
lowed a comparative case study approach. We focused our inquiry
around four different case studies using a DR project, or suite of
projects and practices, as our unit of analysis. As Table 3 reveals,
these four cases involved different types of disasters and sociotech-
nical systems, time periods, regulatory regimes, and sectors. We
selected the United States because it is home to the world’s largest
economy and yet it still faced serious issues in recovering from a
severe hurricane. We selected Thailand due to the scale and extent
of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, impacts felt well beyond its bor-
ders due to the death of international tourists. We selected the
Philippines as one of the more recent disasters with the highly
impoverished Visaya region affected. We selected New Zealand
because it has recently experienced a sequence of earthquakes
resulting in significant loss of life, properties and infrastructure.
Each case study proceeds according to the same five-paragraph
structure (we had to keep them brief for obvious reasons of fitting
them into a single article). Each case begins with a summary of the
DR project, and then dedicates one paragraph each to enclosure,
exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment.4. Hurricane Katrina reconstruction in the United States (2005–
2008)
On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made
landfall in the United States, hitting the coast of Louisiana withwind speeds of 125 miles per hour near Buras-Triumph. It was
not the strongest of storms in terms of wind speeds, central pres-
sures, or intensity—it was only a Category 3 hurricane—but its par-
ticular location along the Gulf Coast, and its abundant amount of
rainfall and storm surge made it ‘‘the most devastating and costly
hurricane in U.S. history” at that time (Cutter et al., 2006). At least
1,800 people died in the hurricane (one of them shown in Fig. 1)
and its subsequent floods, and total cleanup and repair costs have
been estimated at $80–$400 billion (Atkins and Moy, 2005; Lowe
and Shaw, 2009). Although the storm’s wrath was felt from central
Florida to Southern Texas, most of the damage occurred in New
Orleans, Louisiana, after its levee system failed and about 80 per-
cent of the city was flooded with stagnant water for many weeks
(Bergal et al., 2007). That catastrophe was so stark that one expert
has called it ‘‘the worst civil engineering disaster” in American his-
tory (Seed, 2007). More than 110,000 of 180,000 homes in New
Orleans were flooded, and half sat for days or even weeks in more
than six feet of water. After Katrina, 350,000 automobiles had to be
drained of oil and gasoline and then ‘‘recycled,” in addition to
60,000 boats, 300,000 underground fuel tanks, and 42,000 tons of
hazardous waste (Bullard and Wright, 2009). Katrina displaced at
least 1.5 million people and saw a similar number of disaster relief
applications—the largest ever recorded—leading to ‘‘one of the lar-
gest disaster diasporas” in the history of the country (Bullard and
Wright, 2009). As Elliot and Pais argued (2006: 302), at that time
there were ‘‘no precedents for this degree of sudden devastation
and outmigration from a major urban region.”
Hurricane Katrina recovery exemplified different yet intercon-
nected types of enclosure: expanded corporate control and profi-
teering over previously public services; the capture of public
housing by private actors; and the takeover of public schools
(Bullard and Wright, 2009). Millions of homes owned or occupied
by evacuees were declared a nuisance and marked for demolition
so that they could resold at cutthroat rates (Inniss, 2007). More-
over, before the hurricane, schooling in New Orleans was primarily
public. However, the storm charter schools acquired rent-free
buildings, strategically purchased public school buildings deemed
a nuisance, and took advantage of falling property prices (Wright
and Bullard, 2009). Seen in this light, private actors used Katrina
recovery efforts to reshape the city around their narrow goals.
Katrina recovery perpetuated or created forms of exclusion as
well, especially for the free movement of people across the city,
access to reconstruction jobs, and planning discussions. Evacuees
for instance were physically excluded from wealthier parts of
New Orleans. On September 1, 2005, three days after Katrina made
landfall, thousands of evacuees reportedly fleeing the Convention
Center marched towards a bridge that would take them to safety,
only to be turned back by police and sheriffs from Gretna, a pre-
dominately white, middleclass neighborhood (Henkel, Dovidio, &
Gaertner, 2006). Another form of exclusion relates to contracts
and jobs for reconstruction. Oddly, here, builders took advantage
of undocumented (illegal) workers willing to accept extremely
low wages, sidelining those seeking competitive wages (Bullard
and Wright, 2009). Also, volunteers and front-line disaster work-
ers, especially women and minorities, were ‘‘excluded from the
processes of developing and setting priorities for the recovery”
and ‘‘became discouraged and fatigued at not being heard”
(Weber and Messias, 2012).
The encroachment effects of Hurricane Katrina recovery involve
a relaxation of environmental standards, environmental perturba-
tions concerning infrastructure repair and dredging, and a concen-
tration of toxic pollution and debris among some communities. To
expedite emergency repairs to levees and, at a later stage, infras-
tructural rehabilitation work, local, state, and national environ-
mental standards were curtailed following Katrina (Olson, 2005).
For example, federal requirements concerning the disposal of con-
Table 3
Summary of four political economy of DR case studies.









High income Hurricane Flood levees, emergency assistance, insurance, dredging
Boxing Day Tsunami 2004–2007 Thailand Middle income Tsunami Global aid assistance, major rebuilding of hotels and tourist
infrastructure, flood defenses, targeted subsidies for fishing
Typhoon Yolanda 2013–current Philippines Lower-middle
income
Typhoon Global aid assistance, major reconstruction and rebuilding, seawalls and
tidal embankments, fisheries restoration, micro-finance schemes
Canterbury Earthquakes 2010–2011 New
Zealand
High income Earthquakes Recovery and rebuilding, revitalization of the Central Business District,
insurance, strengthening of building codes
Source: Authors.
Fig. 1. A Bloated Body in the Floodwaters near the New Orleans Superdome, United States, September 2005. Source: U.S. National Guard.
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wastes intermingled with ordinary items being sent to landfills
without protective liners (Moe, 2010). In another case, state offi-
cials relaxed open burning bans to enable the burning of debris
in open pits without air pollution controls (Mitsch, 2014). Infras-
tructure repair and rehabilitation efforts following the storm were
so comprehensive, and focused on enhancing human safety, that
they often damaged the environment through the use of heavy
equipment, dispersal of rock and sand, and dredging (DesRoches,
2012; Poe, 2005). A final encroachment effect related to the con-
centration of pollution, notably from debris and removal of haz-
ardous materials, in certain communities. Cleanup efforts
concentrated much of this pollution in particular landfills or along-
side minority neighborhoods (Harden et al., 2007). Furthermore,
sediment in the wake of floodwaters left many schools in minority
areas with drinking water contaminated with levels of arsenic in
excess of federal standards (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2006).
Entrenchment—aggravating the disempowerment of women or
minorities and/or worsening asymmetrical concentrations of
wealth—is our final factor at play in Katrina. Racial bias has been
confirmed in impacts of the storm and property flooded, with Afri-
can Americans and other minorities occupying more low-lying
land and/or land poorly protected by infrastructure (Driesen
et al., 2005). Access to transportation and the ability to evacuate
had a racial bias, with roughly one in ten African Americansinitially evacuated compared to almost nine out of ten Caucasians
(Masozera, Bailey, & Kerchner, 2007). Persons forcibly displaced
and/or forced into living in temporary shelters had a racial bias:
African Americans sometimes lived in cardboard boxes labeled
‘‘Katrina ghettos” while white families lived in hotel rooms or on
cruise ships (Bullard and Wright, 2009). Racial bias was also con-
firmed in effectiveness in finding new housing—in the disaster
area, and across the country—after the storm (white families were
reportedly favored two to one by housing companies) (National
Fair Housing Alliance, 2005) as well as in the ability to return to
New Orleans and the Gulf (Fussell, Sastry, & VanLandingham,
2010). Indeed, 47 percent of African Americans were unable to
return to New Orleans compared to only 19 percent of white
households (Bullard and Wright, 2009). There were also multiple
reported incidents of female rescue workers being sexually
assaulted and raped, but virtually no cases of men facing the same
threats (Luft, 2008).
5. Tsunami recovery in Thailand (2004–2006)
On the morning of the 26th December 2004, a magnitude 9.3
submarine earthquake occurred in the Indian Ocean, 160 km west
of Sumatra. The earthquake deformed the ocean floor and gener-
ated a tsunami which caused one of the greatest natural disasters
of the last century. Around 300,000 people died in an arc of devas-
tation from Indonesia through Malaysia, Thailand, India, Sri Lanka
Fig. 2. The stranded Blue Angel in Ban Naem Khem Khao Lak Thailand. Source: Authors.
248 B.K. Sovacool et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 243–255and East Africa. Large areas of coastal southern Thailand – as well as
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India – were transformed when the tsu-
nami swept ashore. Fig. 2 shows one fishing boat thrownmore than
a kilometer from the seashore. Officially, there were 5395 con-
firmed deaths in Thailand, with a further 2932 people listed as
missing. Most of the deaths were concentrated in the provinces of
Phang-nga and Krabi, with smaller numbers of fatalities in Phuket,
Ranong, Satun and Trang. The outcomes of recovery trajectories in
Thailand have both positive and negative impacts on people and
the environment (Tan-Mullins, Rigg, & Grundy-Warr, 2007).
The enclosure facilitated by tsunami recovery efforts was both
physical and procedural. Small scale tourism operators claimed
that the government under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
was using the disaster to gain access to some of the best tourist
development land through evacuating pre-tsunami operators in
the interests of the environment and disaster mitigation under
the Designated Area for Sustainable Tourism Administration plan
or Dasta (Charoenpo, 2005). After the tsunami, the government,
enclosed areas as ‘‘no-build zones” (Suppasri et al., 2015), and
put in place a policy of providing free housing and title deeds in
inland locations to tsunami-affected fisher folks. The policy was
rejected by many local communities and civil society as inappro-
priate as from a livelihood perspective, it was impossible for fishers
to travel tens of miles daily to fish. This was made even more dif-
ficult by the fact that citizenship identification papers, ownership
documentation (of land and property) and insurance policies were
washed away by the tsunami. Without such documentation it was
hard, sometimes impossible, for victims to secure employment,
access health care, and receive aid assistance, even inheritances
from deceased family members (East-West Center, 2005).
In terms of exclusion, tight procedural deadlines for submission
of documents for compensation ended up excluding many small
scale fishers from receiving donor aid. For example, boat owners
in Thailand had to register within 15 days the loss of their vessels.
The Provincial Fisheries Office (or District Fisheries Office) had to
then collate the documents and check their accuracy before send-
ing them to the Department of Fisheries within 120 days (Funge-
Smith, 2006). In some places, fishers missed the deadline and,therefore, were excluded from the compensation process.
However, the most obvious excluded group of stakeholders were
Burmese migrant workers, particularly those who were working
illegally in Thailand. According to Keys, Masterman-Smith, and
Cottle (2006), the Thai government used the tsunami as an oppor-
tunity to deport undocumented Burmese immigrants. Following
the tsunami, as least 2000 Burmese were rounded up, detained
and then deported.
In terms of encroachment, the abundant supply of new fishing
boats disbursed by various donors (private and public) had the
effect of depleting fish stocks. ‘‘Prior to the tsunami, villagers fished
on a self-sufficiency basis,” said Adul, deputy secretary of the Fed-
eration of Southern Small-scale Fishermen (FSSF), a network of
fishing communities in 13 provinces on the Andaman Sea. ‘‘But
now they have new boats and gear, and many want to catch more
fish” (Tan-Mullins et al., 2007: 125). This negative impact on the
environment occurred during the rebuilding process as a misuse
of the generosity of the public, due to lack of aid coordination
and disbursement.
In terms of entrenchment, official aid disbursements followed
patterns of discrimination linked to ethnicity, religion, class, and
gender (East-West Center, 2005). Buddhists for example received
an abundance of aid due to larger donations and a better religious
network. There were also reported cases of aid being given out for
the purposes of trying to convert Muslims into Christians, stating
attendance at masses as one of the conditions to receive aid
(Burke, 2005). These factors could explain why the Asian Develop-
ment Bank projected that the tsunami placed more two million
people into chronic poverty across Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, the
Maldives and Thailand, one million of which would remain in pov-
erty after recovery efforts (Hagiwara and Sugiyarto, 2005).6. Typhoon Yolanda rebuilding in the Philippines (2013–
current)
On 8 November 2013, super-typhoon Yolanda (international
name Haiyan) hit the Visayas region of the Philippines (see
B.K. Sovacool et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 243–255 249Fig. 3). Yolanda was one of the strongest typhoons ever to make
landfall. Wind speeds reached 315 km per hour and a storm surge
reached six meters in some places (Lagmay, 2014). Official figures
indicate that 6293 individuals were reported dead; most perished
by mass drowning (Yi et al., 2015). In addition, 1061 went missing,
28,689 were injured, and 4.1 million people were internally dis-
placed and more than 14 million people affected (Lum et al.,
2014). The typhoon impacted 591 municipalities and total damage
is estimated at almost $1 billion; more than 1.1 million houses
were damaged, and 500,000 completely destroyed (Yamada and
Galat, 2014). The Philippine Foreign Aid Transparency Hub
(Foreign Aid Transparency Hub, 2016) reports that almost $400
million have been channeled into international calamity and aid
assistance programs, signifying a significant international relief
effort. However, poverty and livelihood concerns in the Eastern
Visayas has increased substantially since the typhoon and the
rebuilding of sustainable communities in the longer term is an
ongoing concern.
In aid distribution throughout the Philippines, enclosure
occurred as the aid disbursement process shifted from the national
government and aid organizations to private individuals such as
barangay captains (village headman). Barangay captains were
heavily involved in compiling lists of residents that qualified for
aid. Some residents reported that those who were perceived to
oppose the barangay captain politically were excluded from the
lists (Eadie et al., 2017). This meant that many were formally dis-
qualified from aid. Other residents also complained that barangay
captains and even municipal officers skimmed off the best goods
(imported goods were regarded as premium) for themselves. Fur-
thermore, Oxfam (2014: 3) documented that typhoon recoveryFig. 3. Path of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Source: Long et al.provided ‘‘opportunities for land speculation and land grabs as a
result of population displacement.”
Exclusion occurred as well. Before the typhoon, in places such as
the provincial capital of Leyte, Tacloban, about one-third of the
population were squatters residing on the disaster-prone coastline
(Yamada and Galat, 2014). Shortly after Yolanda a verbal directive
from President Aquino ordered that no houses were to be built in a
zone reaching 40 m from the sea. A corresponding Department of
Environment and Natural Resources directive was subsequently
brought into law in March 2014 as House Resolution No. 947. Peo-
ple in Yolanda-affected areas who lost their houses in the no dwell
zone were excluded from receiving Department of Social Welfare
and Development funded Emergency Shelter Assistance. Civil soci-
ety groups, notably domestic and international nongovernmental
organizations, were also restricted from assisting rebuilding in
these zones. However, the construction of permanent, or even
transitional housing, has been painfully slow (Magtulis, 2016;
Cruz et al., 2016). Oxfam (2014) estimated that as many as
200,000 people were specifically at risk of eviction via government
proposals to build safer communities. Finally, after the typhoon,
Philippines’ Environment Secretary began a program of mangrove
replanting and rehabilitation to provide a buffer against future
storms, efforts that excluded people from living in those forested
areas (Long, Giri, Primavera, & Trivedi, 2016).
Duplicated aid and an emphasis on fisheries also perpetuated
encroachment. Some villages reported a 50 percent increase in
the number of boats, however this corresponded with negative
impacts on the sustainability of fisheries. Another example is the
Tacloban Embankment Project. A year after typhoon Yolanda, the
local government, together with support from the Japanese gov-
ernment and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, pro-
posed to build a seawall along the Tacloban-Palo-Tanuan
seafront. The Department of Public Works and Highway says the
7.9 billion peso (US $155 million) road heightening and tide
embankment project promises to protect Yolanda-effected areas
in these three municipals from future calamites such as storm
surge. The overall conceptual plan is to build a 27.3 km tidal
embankment with a height of around 4.5 m. Local fishers and envi-
ronmental groups have spoken out against the ‘‘great wall of Leyte”
(UNTV, 2016). This is because the seawall will remove the liveli-
hood options of the current fishers, and will also alter the ecosys-
tem and ecology in the coastal area and affect the ecosystem’s
services provided by the coastal sea.
The process of rebuilding also facilitated entrenchment. As one
of the rebuilding strategies, different official and unofficial micro-
finance schemes were established to focus on lending smaller
amounts of money to women. Such projects can be beneficial
financially and build skills and capacity. However, some of these
benefits were offset by rogue financing schemes and exploitative
lenders who further placed their marginalised customers in a dis-
advantaged position by charging large amounts of interest or by
withholding their cash cards and holding them in financial bon-
dage. There was a gender and rural bias to the aid disbursement
as well; even though the largest agricultural sector directly dam-
aged by the typhoon was coconut farming, such rural enterprises
received few resources; and even though women were the most
affected class of victims, they received fewer funding than men,
especially fishermen. Oxfam (2014) for instance documented that
‘‘women face[d] particular risks of exclusion or marginalization.”
Given the exclusion noted above, Oxfam (2014) suggests that the
Build Back Better program has only perpetuated a cycle of land
tenure ‘‘insecurity” among the landless, with displaced persons
more likely after the typhoon to lack a rightful claim to land, to fall
into poverty, to lack permanent housing, and/or to move back to
unsafe land.
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2017)
On September 4, 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck Dar-
field (about 40 km west of Christchurch, Canterbury) at a depth of
11 km, and five months later, on February 22, 2011, Christchurch (a
city of about 370,000 inhabitants at the time) was struck by a 6.3
magnitude aftershock at a depth only 5 km – the latter resulting
in 185 fatalities. The Canterbury earthquake sequence included
more than 10,000 tremors, 400 of these were greater than magni-
tude 4 and 40 greater than magnitude 5 (Wilson, 2013). The quake
sequence, shown in Fig. 4 (Morgan et al., 2015), resulted in the lar-
gest damage in Aotearoa New Zealand’s history since European set-
tlement (Stevenson et al., 2011). The severe ground motions
caused the collapse of many commercial, industrial and residential
buildings in Christchurch’s Central Business District (CBD) and liq-
uefaction of the surface soils over a large region resulted in exten-
sive damage to infrastructure (Potter et al., 2011). About 100,000
homes (half the housing stock) were damaged, a further 7000 were
so badly damaged they were deemed uninhabitable, and 3000 of
the 5000 businesses in the CBD were displaced (Paton et al.,
2014). Essentially, the earthquake crippled the CBD with many
major parts of the city closed to the public for more than two years
after (Brown, et al., 2010). Furthermore, Canterbury earthquake
response and recovery is among the most costly to date, estimated
at $40 billion (Wood, Noy, & Parker, 2016). The rebuild of Christch-
urch has been characterized as ‘‘slow,” with a local newspaper not-
ing that 2017—years after the quake—may be the year that
Christchurch finally moves from ‘‘a city in recovery to a city in
rebuild” (The Press, 2016).
The process of enclosure in response to the Canterbury earth-
quake sequence can be characterized by various activities. One is
the centralization of power within the national government. TheFig. 4. The Canterbury earthquake sequence from 4th SeptemCanterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency (CERA) was established
as a government department following the February earthquake
to coordinate the Government’s response. The Canterbury Earth-
quake Recovery Bill endowed CERA and the Earthquake Recovery
Minister with the executive power to stipulate legislation without
the agreement of Parliament. For example, CERA could suspend or
extend laws and regulations. It could acquire, hold and dispose of
property, and the Minister was able to fast-track planning pro-
cesses. This presented the potential for ‘‘unilateral decision making
in the name of economic necessity” (Tudor, 2013: 22). Hopkins
(2011) warned ‘‘that these decisions [about Christchurch] will be
left to a minister with huge, unchallengeable legal powers, moni-
tored only by a panel of ‘experts’ of his own choosing.” As Gibson
et al. (2016: 14) add, ‘‘All the key pieces of legislation in the natural
hazard risk management framework are under review or have had
reforms introduced to strengthen the national government’s role,
standardize and streamline policies, curb perceived bureaucracy
and shorten decision making processes. There are strong concerns
about the retreat from decentralized and collaborative governance
approaches and the potential lasting implications for local govern-
ment and representative democracy.” It also marks significant
departure from established New Zealand norms of deliberate and
more democratic forms of governance, with Mamula-Seadon and
McLean (2015: 90-91) noting the earthquakes ‘‘transformed signif-
icantly” governance structures with ‘‘top-heavy” management and
that CERA was not ‘‘well equipped” in dealing with community
planning and citizen empowerment. This centralized government
response posed a number of issues for effective and efficient
response and recovery management, and it also eroded authority
held previously by locally organized groups.
Exclusion was apparent as well. The centralized top-down
approach to recovery and rebuild has been described by local
media as ‘‘bureaucratic, militaristic and the opposite of theber 2010 to 4th June 2012. Source: Morgan et al. (2015)
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resulted in exclusion of groups of people from decision-making
on a number of levels and even an abdication of responsibility from
local actors (Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 2015). Christchurch for
instance experienced the ‘‘loss of an effective or meaningful demo-
cratic voice at local government level” (Hayward, 2012: 37). Some
suggested that the Government used the earthquakes as a justifica-
tion to postpone regional government elections. This meant that
regional and local councils were excluded from making decisions
about their own resource use. The establishment of CERA further
marginalized the role of locally elected urban authorities in the
recovery and excluded them from making decisions about
locally-relevant issues. Local residents were also excluded from
decision-making processes around the status of their homes and
in some cases excluded from having a voice in decisions about
the rebuild of the city. For example, homeowners faced issues
accessing insurance cover for repairing and rebuilding homes,
and many homeowners were (and still are) locked in disputes with
insurers. In 2017, six years after the devastating quake, it is esti-
mated that nearly 3000 residential insurance claims relating to
property damage remain unsettled (Insurance Council of New
Zealand, 2017). The rights of residents to appeal decisions that
directly affect them have been limited with residents generally
having ‘‘little say” in what happens (The Press, 2017). Lastly, mean-
ingful engagement and involvement of local indigenous Ma¯ori peo-
ple has been minimal, with Gibson et al. (2016: 14) writing that
‘‘institutional resistance has prevented the inclusion of Ma¯ori
and/or communitarian approaches within hierarchical emergency
management practices which have encouraged both expert as well
as individualized responses to natural hazard risks.” (To be fair, the
experience with exclusion was not entirely negative—the earth-
quake did catalyze an important national debate about inclusion
and equality in national disaster policy, as well as the need for
new approaches to political deliberation and governance, see
Cretney (2016) and Gibson et al. (2016) for more).
In terms of encroachment, the rebuild of Christchurch city has
required extensive infrastructural repairs given the sheer damage
caused by the earthquake, the many aftershocks, and unprece-
dented levels of liquefaction. Liquefaction occurs when soils below
groundwater level temporarily behave like a liquid, as they lose
strength and stiffness when they move during a quake (Potter,
Becker, Johnston, & Rossiter, 2015). Repairing such infrastructure
and addressing liquefaction, however, has involved a meaningful
increase in carbon emissions. While there was a reduction in over-
all energy use immediately after the earthquakes, energy use is
estimated to be 3.7 per cent higher than pre-quake levels, mainly
as a result of a rise in diesel use from heavy demolition vehicles
(Cockrem and Priest, 2013). Land use has also changed significantly
in and around the periphery of the city, as a result of liquefaction.
Businesses, shops and restaurants in the CBD experienced exten-
sive damage and many moved to the outer suburbs of the city.
Average trip distance has increased and public transport and activeTable 4
Policy mechanisms for more just and equitable disaster recovery.
Dimension Mechanism Exp
Poverty and vulnerability Insurance and liability Crea
that
Exclusion and marginalization Adhere to Free Prior Informed Consent Mai
eng
Social and environmental damage Implement punitive bonds Env
com
or t
Source: Authors.travel have become less attractive modes of transport. The use of
public transport use dropped 44% between 2010 and 2012 with
the loss of 50,000 jobs in the central city and the central bus
exchange (Cockrem and Priest, 2013). Sir Mark Solomon, the head
of the local Ma¯ori iwi (tribe) Nga¯i Tahu, noted that the rebuild has
not put enough emphasis on sustainability: ‘‘It was certainly one of
my visions that we would adopt full green technology across the
city. But if you go through the subdivisions – including our own
– it’s the same old, same old” (The Guardian, 2014).
Entrenchment occurred largely due to a market led recovery
approach that did not appreciate vulnerability, especially for those
on lower incomes or those who did not own property. About a
third of residents in Christchurch are renters, and with large resi-
dential areas red-zoned and uninhabitable, reduced supply of
housing meant that the cost of rental housing skyrocketed. As
Sarah Richardson, Christchurch Methodist Mission chief executive
remarks: ‘‘that market reality is a dozen people sharing a house,
people camping in garages, people sleeping in cars . . .. For those
at the bottom, those with the least control over their lives, we
are seeing the least being done to sort their housing problems”
(quoted in The Press, 2013). Instead, the focus appears to be on
the rebuild of the CBD, with bars, cafes, shops, and a convention
center, exacerbating social and economic inequalities. Moreover,
roughly 20% of earthquake losses were not covered by insurance,
and for the roughly 800,000 related insurance claims that did pro-
ceed (including residential and non-residential), the national
insurance cover provided by the Earthquake Commission capped
damages at NZ$100,000 (Morgan et al., 2015). Consequently,
Paton et al. (2015) argue that New Zealand earthquake recovery
has not resulted in effective preparedness for future quakes, with
only a small fraction of households (28%) having basic resilience
measures (e.g., having food and water for at least three days) in
place.
8. Policy implications and recommendations
Although the political economy processes of DR can at times
distort or mold projects and processes to the interests of dominant
stakeholders, that is not to say that they completely undermine or
obfuscate all of the benefits of DR. Even the specific critiques we
raise, some of them quite sobering, are aimed at a target: improv-
ing and learning so that the least vulnerable are helped, and so that
benefits and burdens are made visible, and distributed fairly and
according to representative processes. Practitioners of DR need to
become more cognizant of the potential for projects to harm
others, or admit complicity in the processes of enclosure, exclu-
sion, encroachment, and entrenchment. In short, DR advocates
must continually ask, ‘‘Recovery for whom?”
With this in mind, DR efforts need not always pose such a grave
threat to vulnerable groups. As Table 4 summarizes, three policy
mechanisms can do much to minimize and manage the political
and economic dangers that can arise in recovery efforts.lanation
te an insurance scheme that helps equitably socialize the risks of disasters so
sufficient resources are available to assist the poor and vulnerable
ntain a robust consultative process whereby a potentially affected community
ages in an open and informed dialogue with disaster recovery managers
ironmental bonds would require disaster recovery sponsors to provide
pensation that would be voided or forfeited when projects damage communities
he environment
Table 5
Summary of political economy of disaster recovery case studies.
Process Case study Explanation
Enclosure Hurricane Katrina Public recovery resources primarily benefitted large corporations (casinos, cruise line ships, port operators) and
homeowners; private actors use recovery to facilitate their own housing development plans or the capture of public school
buildings
Boxing Day Tsunami Government-linked private companies used no-build zone policies to seize prized beach front land for their own
developments
Typhoon Yolanda Privatization of aid distribution reduced the effectiveness of aid, resettlement patterns threatened by land grabs
Canterbury Earthquakes Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act conferred unilateral power to the national government so that it could
suspend laws, acquire, hold and dispose of property
Exclusion Hurricane Katrina Businesses employed low-wage undocumented workers in reconstruction work, excluding others; minority evacuees faced
rent hikes or eviction; women and disaster front-line volunteers were excluded from planning discussions
Boxing Day Tsunami Marginalizing policies with tedious procedures for claims excluded certain groups from receiving aid and compensation
Typhoon Yolanda A 40 m ‘no-build zone’ excluded landless occupants from the rehousing process
Canterbury Earthquakes A centralized government approach interfered with decision-making processes of local officials and weakened the rights of
homeowners in securing insurance claims
Encroachment Hurricane Katrina Reconstruction involved infrastructure repair and dredging done in conditions of relaxed environmental standards
Boxing Day Tsunami Lack of coordination between agencies resulted in more fishing boats given to communities and intensified fishing
activities with depleted fishery resources
Typhoon Yolanda Embankments altered the ecology and ecosystem services provision of coastal areas
Canterbury Earthquakes Infrastructural repairs resulted in significant diesel emissions; rezoning of urban areas as a result of liquefaction resulted in
longer commuting distances
Entrenchment Hurricane Katrina Poor, minority, female evacuees were less likely to have access to transport, more likely to face forcible resettlement or
remain in temporary shelters; private developers used the disaster as an opportunity to promote their own agendas
Boxing Day Tsunami Non-Buddhist communities received less aid due to smaller networks; some donations were politicized and used convert
followers
Typhoon Yolanda DR and rebuilding strategies focused on men; women were further marginalized with microfinance schemes; poverty and
land tenure insecurity were worsened via recovery efforts
Canterbury Earthquakes Market led recovery approach increased the vulnerability of renters/tenants and the poor
Source: Authors.
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the vulnerable. This could be done through a global insurance and
liability regime that addresses some of the causes behind more
severe disasters, such as climate change, through a tax or financial
compensatory mechanism (Spreng et al., 2016). Such a liability tax
or insurance scheme would ensure that the cost of disaster relief
following a hurricane must include not only physical reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation, but also funding to defray the social
impacts facing migratory refugees and sensitivity to environmental
recovery and bioremediation. Or, that the cost of afforestation to
minimize erosion must include money for planting trees as well
as compensation for those forcibly relocated from the conservation
area and retraining for farmers or fishers who have lost their jobs.
The second recommendation is to promote Free Prior Informed
Consent (FPIC) so that no coercion, intimidation, or manipulation
has occurred in the design or implementation of a disaster relief
project (Aton and Shelton, 2011). It demands that consent has been
sought sufficiently in advance of any meaningful decision to pro-
ceed; that information about the project is provided that covers
its nature, size, pace, reversibility, and scope; and that agreement
with proposed project measures exists. Although such FPIC would
need to be obtained quickly—there is a justifiable sense of urgency
and immediacy in DR objectives—it would help to counter disem-
powerment and elitism. Managers of recovery efforts could for
instance be explicitly charged with identifying community and
minority groups and seeking their input; moreover, assessments
of the social and environmental impacts of recovery could be
dynamic, and undertaken by panels charged to take complex exist-
ing disparities into account (Sovacool, 2017).
Thirdly, environmental bonds for disaster recovery would pro-
vide a contractual guarantee that the principal of the bond (a pro-
ject manager, for instance) performs in an environmentally benign,
and socially responsible, manner. Bonds would be levied for the
current best estimate of the largest potential damages, but
returned (with interest) if no harm is done (Sovacool and Linnér,
2015). This type of bonding may sound radical, but similarapproaches already exist in the domains of construction, mining,
and nuclear power. The 1935 Miller Act in the United States
requires that contractors performing construction for the federal
government secure performance bonds, a contractual guarantee
that the principal (the entity which is doing the work or providing
the service) will perform in a designated way; the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 stipulated the use of perfor-
mance bonds to guarantee reclamation of mining sites for coal
and other minerals; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission stipulates
regulations similar to bonds for the decommissioning of nuclear
facilities and the storage and disposal of nuclear waste (Cornwell
and Costanza, 1999).9. Conclusion
In sum, the political economy of DR, namely the processes of
enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment, can distort
the goals and effects of even the best intentioned efforts and prac-
tices. All four of our case studies exhibited all four of our political
economy processes, which we summarize in Table 5. In the United
States, Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts consolidated corporate
control and facilitated profiteering over publicly available disaster
relief aid, and enabled private actors to procure public housing pro-
jects and local schools; they also excluded many evacuees from
motorized transportation and accommodation, and further
degraded the natural environment via reconstruction efforts and
dredging. In Thailand and Philippines, the ‘‘no-build zones”
associated with recovery created new spaces of contestation in
terms of ownership of land and property. Similarly, the politics of
aid distribution in both countries saw efforts prioritize some
sectors (notably fishing) with deleterious effects on fish stocks
and the exclusion of others (coconut farming), and efforts
marginalized certain classes and ethnic or religious groups in the
DR process. In New Zealand, the Canterbury earthquakes enabled
the central government to suspend Parliamentary checks and
B.K. Sovacool et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 243–255 253balances, eroded local authority, deepened dependence on carbon-
intensive forms of energy and rates of household poverty, and did
not result in effective preparedness for future quakes.
What to do? We advocate three policy recommendations. One
solution is for better insurance schemes and spread and socialize
the risks (and costs) of disasters so they do not fall inequitably
on the poor and helpless. One is to put vulnerable groups and frag-
ile ecosystems front and center in the aftermath of disasters via
improved procedures for Free Prior Informed Consent and an expli-
cit mandate to recognize disparities. One is to design and trial envi-
ronmental bonds that withhold compensation from projects that
damage communities or the environment. The people most
affected by disasters never choose to have them occur, but which
policy mechanisms the DR community decides to adopt next could
be critically important for their wellbeing.
Notwithstanding these suggestions, which are about policy, we
must also be continually aware of politics, the underlying social,
political, or economic forces behind policy interventions. That
means recognizing that DR recovery in many ways is less about
rationally optimizing pathways and more about politically manag-
ing tradeoffs: disasters can overwhelm local and national capacity
but also put intense pressure to delivery recovery services. Imme-
diacy must be balanced with precaution; familiarity balanced with
creativity; cost-effectiveness balanced with sensitivity and specific
needs balanced by equitable and holistic decision-making pro-
cesses. The risk of natural disasters, politics of disaster recovery,
ecological resilience of affected areas, and local practices of devel-
opment are all intertwined (Gibson et al., 2016; Cretney, 2017).
This reminds us that while disasters (and DR as policy and prac-
tice) may offer windows of opportunity, those windows are often
tinted—shaded and darkened—by structural inequality and the
political economy dynamics and power relations of actors.
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